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VOTING RIGHTS ACT LITIGATION AND
LOS ANGELES COUNTY JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS: MYTHS AND REALITIES
Robert L. Hess*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1998, 64% of California's voters approved Proposition
220, which permits unification of the state's trial courts on majority
vote of both the superior and municipal court judges in each county.'
A year after that historic election, the Los Angeles Superior Court
has voted twice by wide margins to reject unification.2 Although
various concerns have been articulated, the most common issue
raised both by judges and by other persons seems to be the possibil-
ity that judicial unification in Los Angeles County under the terms of
Proposition 220 could lead to a lawsuit brought under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. 3 A settlement or adverse judgment in such a
case, they fear, could result in the demise of county-wide elections
* Judge of the Municipal Court of California, Los Angeles Judicial Dis-
trict; B.A., 1970, Pomona College; J.D. 1976, University of Southern Califor-
nia Law Center. The opinions and analysis in this Article are those of the
author and are not intended to represent the position of the Los Angeles Mu-
nicipal Court.
1. Senate Constitutional Amendment 4, 9 Cal. Legs. Serv. (West) Res. ch.
36 (1996), amended Articles I and VI of the California Constitution. The basic
unification provision is Article VI Section 5(e).
2. As of this writing, only two of the 58 counties in California-Kern and
Los Angeles-have voted against unification, and Los Angeles County is the
only one to do so twice. Of the four counties-Kings, Merced, Monterey, and
Yuba-which require preclearance from the United States Department of Jus-
tice under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c,
Yuba and Merced Counties have apparently received preclearance, and Kings
and Monterey Counties are preparing requests for preclearance. See Judicial
Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts, News Release No.
43, July 16, 1999 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973gg-10 (1994).
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for the Superior Court. Uncertainty over what might replace the cur-
rent election system, how such a change might affect the independ-
ence, accountability, and re-election hopes of the judges, and its pos-
sible impact on public perceptions of access to and fairness of the
judicial system, are all factors in varying degrees.
The purposes of this Article are to summarize the law relating to
the application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to judicial elec-
tions, and to discuss the procedures and some of the criteria used in
evaluating a challenge to judicial elections under that statute.4 This
Article will not attempt to address the merits of any potential chal-
lenge because that is virtually impossible without knowing how the
challenge will be stated and what evidence will be presented in sup-
port of the claim. Nevertheless, any dispassionate review of the law
reveals that a serious Voting Rights Act challenge to judicial unifi-
cation would require an enormous commitment of time and financial
resources by any individual or organization bringing such a case,
with a relatively low likelihood of success.
II. THE 1982 AMENDMEqTS TO THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, pro-
vides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or stan-
dard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in con-
travention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)
of this title, 5 as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
4. This Article will not address any issues arising under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act as discussed in Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266
(1999), and its predecessors.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) provides: "No voting qualification or prerequi-
site to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language minority
group."
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(b) A violation of subsection (a) ... is established if, based
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the politi-
cal processes leading to nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection
(a)... in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political pro-
cess and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent
to which members of a protected class have been elected to
office in the State or political subdivision is one circum-
stance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in
this section establishes a right to have members of a pro-
tected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in
the population.6
This language is the result of the 1982 amendments to the Vot-
ing Rights Act, passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision
in City of Mobile v. Bolden.7 As the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Report demonstrates, those amendments were passed, in part, to
make clear that intent to discriminate is not an element to be proved
by the plaintiffs in a Section 2 case, and that the case could be
proved by discriminatory effect alone.8 However, the 1982 amend-
ments represented a compromise between different interests in Con-
gress,9 and all the language in Section 2 must be read together.
Construing the text as a whole, several points emerge. First, the
statute applies to any state or political subdivision. Los Angeles
County is a political subdivision for purposes of Section 2, l ° and the
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
7. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
8. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT 417].
9. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986) (rejecting argu-
ment that SENATE REPORT 417, supra note 8, should therefore be accorded less
weight); id. at 83-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (referring to 1982
amendments as "compromise legislation'); see also Baird v. Consolidated City
of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing the congres-
sional compromise).
10. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
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Supreme Court has held that judicial elections are covered by Section
2.11
Second, the statute requires a "totality of the circumstances" test
be applied to any alleged violation. While the statute itself is silent
on what might constitute relevant circumstances, Senate Report 417
lists "typical factors" which might be probative of a Section 2 viola-
tion. These are:
"1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the
state or political subdivision that touched the right of the
members of the minority group to register, to vote, or oth-
erwise to participate in the democratic process;
"2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;
"3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote re-
quirements, anti-single shot provisions, 12 or other voting
practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity
for discrimination against the minority group;
"4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the mem-
bers of the minority group have been denied access to that
process;
"5. the extent to which members of the minority group in
the state or political subdivision bear the effects of dis-
crimination in such areas as education, employment and
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively
in the political process;
"6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by
overt or subtle racial appeals;
11. See Chisomv. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 391-404 (1991).
12. "Bullet" or "single-shot" voting may occur in an at-large election where
there are more candidates than offices and each voter has the opportunity to
vote for more than one candidate. For example, if five at-large city council
seats are open and there are 12 candidates, then each voter can vote for up to
five candidates. If a minority group concentrates its votes for one or a limited
number of candidates, and if the votes of the majority are divided among a
number of candidates, the minority may be able to elect one or more at-large
candidates even if they represent substantially less than a majority of the vot-
ers. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 n.19 (1980).
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"7. the extent to which members of the minority group have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
"Additional factors that in some cases have had probative
value as part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation
are:
"whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group.
"whether the policy underlying the state or political subdi-
vision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. 13
Third, the Voting Rights Act applies to every "citizen of the
United States." Non-citizens, as part of the general population, may
be counted in apportioning districts, that is, in drawing boundaries to
equalize population. 14 However, for purposes of determining equal-
ity of voting power under the Voting Rights Act, the lower federal
courts have held that "citizen voting-age population" is the appropri-
ate criterion.15
13. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37 (quoting SENATE REPORT 417, supra note 8,
at 28-29). These factors were derived from the analytical fiamework set forth
in the Supreme Court's decision in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), as
refined in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), affid
sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976)
(per curiam).
14. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 773-76 (rejecting apportionment based on num-
bers of voting age citizens); see also Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal.
3d 251, 258-59, 481 P.2d 489, 493-94, 93 Cal. Rptr. 391, 394-96 (1971) (re-
jecting apportionment based on numbers of registered voters).
15. See Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 703-05 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Bialczak v. Barnett, 118 S. Ct. 2372 (1998) (reviewing alter-
natives as to black and Latino claimants); Negron v. City of Miami Beach, 113
F.3d 1563, 1567-69 (11th Cir. 1997); Campos v. City of Houston, 113 F.3d
544, 547-48 (5th Cir. 1997); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1425-
26 (9th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994), the Su-
preme Court noted but expressly declined to resolve the question of whether
age, citizenship and other characteristics of minority populations might be
relevant to either a dilution claim or to fashioning a remedy. See De Grandy,
512 U.S. at 1008-09.
Although some cases use "voting-age population" rather than "citizen
voting-age population," they appear to involve situations where non-citizens
were not a significant part of the relevant population. See, e.g., African-
American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345,
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Fourth, the purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to make sure the
election process is equally open to members of the protected classes
of racial or language minorities. Often plaintiffs bring a Section 2
claim to redress a districting system which has the effect of imper-
missibly diluting minority votes. 16 However, the statute itself states
that it does not establish any "right to have members of a protected
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the popula-
tion."
17
Fifth, the Voting Rights Act applies only to standards, practices,
procedures, qualifications, and prerequisites related to voting. It
does not extend to either the appointment of judges by a state's gov-
ernor or to the pre-appointment screening process.'
8
Although Section 2 explicitly requires application of a totality of
the circumstances test, the statute itself provides no guidance on
how to balance the factors. However, the courts have developed an
1352-53 (8th Cir. 1995); McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 944-
45 (7th Cir. 1988). An exception is Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 908
F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1990), which compared the numbers of registered voters
in each group in its analysis in preference to total population, because no evi-
dence relating to voting age population (and by extension, citizen voting age
population) appeared in the record. See Meek, 908 F.2d at 1541, 1546-47,
nn.5-6.
16. Section 2 "prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, not just vote
dilution." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 n.10 (citing SENATE REPORT 417, supra
note 8, at 30).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). A minority which accounts for 1 percent of a po-
litical subdivision's population and is evenly scattered throughout the subdivi-
sion has no right under Section 2 to demand that the number of offices be in-
creased to the point where it is able to elect its "own" representative. See
Barnett, 141 F.3d at 701-04 (giving this example and noting that the 3 percent
Asian population of Chicago is so distributed as to make it impossible to create
an Asian-maj ority aldermanic ward).
In De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1013-14 & n.11, the Supreme Court distin-
guished between the political or electoral power of minority voters, which is
within the protection of Section 2, and the success of minority-preferred candi-
dates, which is not
18. See Chisomv. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401 (1991) ("Louisiana could, of
course, exclude its judiciary from the coverage of the Voting Rights Act by
changing to a system in which judges are appointed .... "); African-American
Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Missouri, 994 F. Supp. 1105, 1122
(E.D. Mo. 1997) (challenging Missouri's merit selection plan for judicial ap-
pointments, which placed all judges on the bench initially by appointment),
aff'dmem., 133 F.3d 921 (Sth Cir. 1998).
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analytical approach to Section 2 cases largely in reference to Senate
Report 417; but, they have done nothing to particularize the standard.
I1I. IhTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2 iN THORNBURG v GINGLES
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the 1982
amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in its 1986 deci-
sion of Thornburg v. Gingles.'9 In Gingles, the State of North Caro-
lina had enacted a redistricting scheme for its legislature, which pro-
vided a mixture of single- and multi-member electoral districts.
20
The scheme was challenged by black voters who alleged that in par-
ticular districts it unlawfully diluted their voting power and conse-
quent ability to elect members of their racial group to office. 21 The
three-judge district court held that the use (in a redistricting plan) of
multi-member districts in five North Carolina legislative districts
violated Section 2 by impairing the opportunity of black voters to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.
22
A. Justice Brennan's Opinion
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the de-
cision of the lower court. Justice Brennan's opinion23 began with an
analysis of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act and ap-
proved the Senate Report 417's enumeration of "typical factors.,
24
He then reviewed the district court's findings.
The district court had found that blacks were sufficiently nu-
merous and concentrated so that they could constitute effective vot-
ing majorities in the districts in question.25 Reviewing the factors of
Senate Report 417, the district court found that official means to dis-
courage black voting since 1900 had included a poll tax, literacy
tests, a prohibition against bullet voting, and designated seat plans
19. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
20. See id. at 35.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 37-38.
23. Joined by Justices Marshall, Blacknun, Stevens, and White as to those
portions which form the opinion of the Court
24. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34-37, 42-46.
25. See id. at 38.
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for multi-member districts.26 There was also evidence of historic
discrimination, which the district court found had hindered blacks'
ability to participate effectively in the political process; it found other
election practices that constituted further barriers and proof that
white candidates encouraged voting along racial lines. 27 The district
court also evaluated the degree to which black candidates had been
successful in elections both statewide and in the challenged districts,
and the statistical evidence relating to racial polarization. 8
Beginning his analysis of Section 2, Justice Brennan emphasized
that the list of factors in Senate Report 417 "is neither comprehen-
sive nor exclusive., 29 No specific number of factors needs to be pre-
sent: "other factors may also be relevant and may be considered,"
the inquiry is to involve a "searching practical evaluation of the 'past
and present reality,"' and it is to be based "on a 'functional' view of
the political process.
30
Justice Brennan then described the limitations on the ways a
Section 2 violation may be proved.
First, electoral devices, such as at-large elections, may not
be considered per se violative of § 2. Plaintiffs must dem-
onstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, the
devices result in unequal access to the electoral process.
Second, the conjunction of an allegedly dilutive electoral
mechanism and the lack of proportional representation
alone does not establish a violation. Third, the results test
does not assume the existence of racial bloc voting; plain-
tiffs must prove it.
31
26. See id. A designated or numbered seat plan requires a candidate for
election in a multi-member district to run for a specific seat See id. at 39 n.6;
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 185 n.21 (1980). California's
requirement that a candidate for a trial court judgeship run for a specific "of-
fice number" when more than one judicial position is up for election in a par-
ticular district in a given year is an example of such a plan. See CAL. ELEC.
CODE §§ 8200, 8202 (Deering 1995).
27. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 39-40.
28. See id. at 38-42.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. (quoting SENATE REPORT 417, supra note 8, at 30 & n.120).
31. Id. at 46 (citations omitted).
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Thus, to establish a Section 2 violation, minority members must
prove "that the use of a multi-member electoral structure operates to
minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their preferred candi-
dates. 32
Justice Brennan then pointed out that the use of multi-member
districts generally would not impede the ability of minority voters to
elect their representatives unless "a bloc voting majority must usu-
ally be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive,
geographically insular minority group. '33 The necessary "precondi-
tions" are:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it
is sufficiently large and geographically compact to consti-
tute a majority in a single-member district. If it is not, as
would be the case in a substantially integrated district, the
multimemberfonn of the district cannot be responsible for
minority voters' inability to elect its candidates.34 Second,
the minority group must be able to show that it is politically
cohesive. If the minority group is not politically cohesive,
it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember elec-
toral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests.
Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in
the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority
candidate running unopposed-usually to defeat the minor-
ity's preferred candidate. In establishing this last circum-
stance, the minority group demonstrates that submergence
in a white multimember district impedes its ability to elect
its chosen representatives.
35
32. Id. at48.
33. Id. at 48-49.
34. In a footnote, Justice Brennan emphasized that "[t]he single-member
district is generally the appropriate standard against which to measure minority
group potential to elect because it is the smallest political unit from which rep-
resentatives are elected." Id. at 50 n.17.
35. Id. at 50-51 (footnotes and citations omitted). Justice Brennan further
noted that "[t]he usual predictability of the majority's success distinguishes
structural dilution from the mere loss of an occasional election." Id. at 51.
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Justice Brennan then considered the statistical evidence on racial
bloc voting relied upon by the district court.36 There are two reasons
why the existence of racially polarized voting is important: first, to
determine whether the minority group is a politically cohesive unit;
and second, to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc
to usually defeat the minority candidate.37 This requires separate in-
quiries into minority and white voting patterns. The analysis must
also include inquiries into such factors as the nature of the allegedly
dilutive electoral mechanism, whether other potentially dilutive
electoral devices are in use, such as majority vote requirements,
designated posts, and prohibitions on bullet voting, the percentage of
registered voters who are members of the minority group, the size of
the district, and the number of seats and the number of candidates in
multi-member districts.38 Even the number of elections which
should be examined depends on the circumstances.39
Next, in Part IV of the opinion, Justice Brennan considered the
extent to which recent black electoral success was probative. He
36. Two methods of analysis were used: extreme case analysis and bivarite
ecological regression analysis. The district court had found both to be standard
in the literature for analysis of racially polarized voting. See Gingles v. Ed-
minsten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 367 n.29, 368 n.32 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
37. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56. Legally significant white bloc voting nor-
mally occurs when the white bloc vote regularly defeats the minority vote plus
any white "crossover" votes. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 56-58. Section III.C of Justice Brennan's opinion analyzed
racial voting patterns and concluded that the reasons white or black voters
voted the way they did, and the race of the candidates, were irrelevant to a
Section2 analysis. See id. at 61-74. Justice Brennan argued that these issues
were inconsistent with the "effects" test articulated in Section 2, and attempted
to resurrect the "intent" test rejected by Congress in the 1982 amendments.
See id. However, only Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined this
part of Justice Brennan's opinion, and therefore, it does not represent the
opinion of the Court. See id. at 106-08.
Concurring in part, Justice White took issue with Justice Brennan's con-
clusion that only the race of the voters, and not the race of the candidate, mat-
tered in determining whether racially polarized voting had occurred. See id. at
83 (White, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor's opinion (joined by three other Justices) also con-
cluded that the race of the candidate could be pertinent to the issue of whether
racially polarized voting had occurred. See id. at 100-01 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in judgment).
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concluded that the fact that a racial minority might gain near-
proportionate representation in one election, particularly one held
after the litigation was filed, was not determinative, and the district
court did not err by not according it decisive weight.40 Finally, the
Court held that the "clearly-erroneous" standard for review of fact
determinations applied to its review of the vote dilution issue.41
B. Justice O'Connor's Opinion Concurring in the Judgment
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment 42 but did not join
Justice Brennan's opinion. The principal points of difference were
over how racial bloc voting and minority voting strength should be
analyzed in vote dilution cases.
Justice O'Connor characterized the majority's test as containing
the following elements: first, that "minority voting strength is to be
assessed solely in terms of the minority group's ability to elect
[those] candidates it prefers"; 43 second, that "undiluted minority
voting strength means the maximum feasible minority voting
strength";4 and third, whatever plan the state adopts must be meas-
ured against this theoretical maximum, and if the minority is unable
to regularly elect as many members of its choice as might be
40. See id. at 74-76. In a portion of the opinion joined by Justice White,
Justice Brennan found that black voters' "sustained success" at achieving pro-
portionate representation in one of the districts did refute the vote dilution
claim as to that district Id. at 77. Justice O'Connor (joined by three other
Justices) agreed with this analysis. See id. at 102-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment). Justice Stevens (joined by two other Justices) would have af-
firmed the district court with respect to this district as well. See id. at 106-08
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The significance of electoral success was reemphasized in Johnson v. De
Grandy. 512 U.S. 997, 1012 n.10 (1994) (citing with approval Baird v. Con-
solidated City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 358, 361 (7th Cir. 1992)).
41. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77-80.
42. See id. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (Burger, C.J.,
Powell, J., & Rehnquist, J., joining).
43. Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring injudgment) (emphasis omitted).
44. Id. at 88-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor
was not persuaded that Congress really intended "undiluted minority voting
strength" to mean "maximum feasible minority voting strength." Id. at 94-95
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Her position was sustained in De
Grandy. See 512 U.S. at 1015-22 (finding that the district court had erred in
holding that anything less than the maximum possible number of minority-
majority districts violated Section 2).
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theoretically possible, the system adopted dilutes minority voting
strength and violates Section 2.
As Justice O'Connor pointed out:
This measure of vote dilution, taken in conjunction
with the Court's standard for measuring undiluted minority
voting strength, creates what amounts to a right to usual,
roughly proportional representation on the part of sizable,
compact, cohesive minority groups .... Unless minority
success under the challenged electoral system regularly ap-
proximates this rough version of proportional representa-
tion, that system dilutes minority voting strength and vio-
lates § 2.46
According to Justice O'Connor, the majority's final test--proof
of racial bloc voting by the white majority-adds nothing, because it
essentially defines legally significant racial bloc voting by the ma-
jority in terms of the extent of the racial minority's electoral success.
If the minority can prove that it could constitute a majority
in a single-member district, that it supported certain candi-
dates, and that those candidates have not usually been
elected, then a finding that there is "legally significant
white bloc voting" will necessarily follow. Otherwise, by
definition, those candidates would usually have won rather
than lost.
47
Justice O'Connor argued that by adopting this circular reasoning, the
majority had ignored most of the Zimmer factors cited by Senate Re-
port 417 as part of the test for a Section 2 claim 48  In Justice
O'Connor's view, the majority had essentially made electoral suc-
cess the single overriding factor in evaluating a vote dilution claim.
49
45. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 90-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
Justice O'Connor's suggestion in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 89-91, 89 n.1
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment), that the majority's analysis was as ap-
plicable to single-member districts as to multi-member districts, became the
law in Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993), and in Vionovich v. Quil-
ter, 507 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1993).
46. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 91 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (em-
phasis added for "proportional").
47. Id. at 92 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
48. See id. at 92-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
49. See id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Justice
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The majority's mistake was in not explicitly using all the rele-
vant factors to determine "whether the minority group has 'less op-
portunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.' 50 In
multi-member district cases, "evaluation of an alleged impairment of
voting strength requires consideration of the minority group's access
to the political process generally, not solely consideration of the
chances that its preferred candidates will actually be elected." 51 The
majority's test therefore violated both the statute's and the legislative
history's express statement that there is no right to strict proportional
representation created by Section 2.52
IV. SELECTED DECISIONS ADDRESSING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
A. Chisom v. Roemer
The Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Chisom v. Roeme 5 3 re-
solved the issue whether Section 2 applies to judicial elections. Chi-
som involved a challenge by black voters in Orleans Parish to an
election system for Louisiana Supreme Court Justices. Under the
challenged system, five justices were elected for ten-year terms from
single-member districts; two from a multi-member district encom-
passing Orleans Parish (majority black); and three surrounding par-
ishes (about three quarters white).54 In a 6-3 decision written by
Justice Stevens, the Court concluded that Section 2 does apply to ju-
dicial elections, and specifically to vote dilution claims.
O'Connor's opinion explained at some length why she thought the majority's
analysis should have put heavier emphasis on the other factors. See id. at 94-
100 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
50. Id. at 99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
51. Id. at 105 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
52. See id. at 96-99, 105 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
53. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
54. See id. at 384-85.
55. See id. at 402-04. The Court distinguished Wells v. Edwards, 347 F.
Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), summarily af'd, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973), in which
the district court had held that "the concept of one-man, one-vote apportion-
ment does not apply to the judicial branch of government," on the basis that
Wells had involved a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, whereas Chisom only involved Section 2 issues. See Chi-
som, 501 U.S. at 3 89-90, 402-03 (quoting Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 454).
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The most interesting portion of the Chisom opinion, for the pur-
pose of this Article, is the Court's observation--twice repeated--that
judges need not be elected at all.56 The Court noted that "ideally
public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the
judge is often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sen-
timent, ' ,57 and cited the widespread historical precedent for appoint-
ment, life tenure, and salary protection to promote judicial independ-
ence.
58
B. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas
A companion case to Chisom was Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Attorney General of Texas.59 The Texas district courts are that
state's trial courts of general jurisdiction.60 Their electoral districts
encompass one or more entire counties, and the geographical area of
the judge's jurisdiction is coextensive with the electoral district.61 In
districts with multiple judicial candidates running in an election, each
The issue presented to the Seventh Circuit in Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d
704 (7th Cir. 1998), was whether a system of appointment plus retention elec-
tions for judges violated the Voting Rights Act. See Bradley, 154 F.3d at 709-
10. The court of appeals held-following Chisom-that judicial retention
elections were within the scope of Section 2. See id. The same conclusion was
reached in African-American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Mis-
souri, 994 F. Supp. 1105, 1122 (E.D. Mo. 1997), aff'd mem., 133 F.3d 921 (8th
Cir. 1998).
56. See, e.g., Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400-01 (stating "Louisiana could, of
course, exclude its judiciary from the coverage of the Voting Rights Act by
changing to a system in which judges are appointed, and, in that way, it could
enable its judges to be indifferent to popular opinion.").
57. Id. at400.
58. See id. at 400 & n.28. A second interesting point is a possible modifi-
cation of Gingles. Justice Stevens emphasized the conjunctive in Section 2(b),
referring to "an injury to members of the protected class who have less 'op-
portunity' than others 'to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice."' Id. at 397 & n.24 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973) (em-
phasis in original). In his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out the issue raised in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Gingles, viz, that Justice Brennan's opinion
had apparently focused only on the ability to elect candidates, and had ignored
the element of participation in the political process. See id. at 407-09 & n.1
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in judgment)).
59. 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
60. See id. at 422.
61. See id. at426.
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runs at-large for a separately numbered seat.62 Election in the pri-
mary requires a majority of the votes cast; however, in the general
election, only a plurality of the votes for that numbered position is
needed.63 The petitioners challenged the at-large voting scheme as
impermissibly diluting the voting power of black and Hispanic vot-
ers, and sought, as the remedy, the creation of election sub-districts
or a modified at-large structure.
64
The Supreme Court's opinion, again written by Justice Stevens,
only expressly addressed the issue of whether the judicial election
system could be subject to a Section 2 challenge. 65 Following the
reasoning in Chisom, the Court rejected the state's argument that ju-
dicial elections should be automatically exempted from Section 2
coverage because each judgeship is a "single-member office" where
the judges' "responsibilities are exercised independently in an area
coextensive with the districts from which they are elected. 66
Like Chisom, however, the Court's comments, rather than its
holding, are of special interest for purposes of this Article. The
Court took pains to address several points raised by Judge Higgin-
botham's concurrence to the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision,67 in-
cluding:
1. Texas trial judges have jurisdiction which is coextensive
with the geographic area from which they are elected, and
have the sole authority to render final decisions; 68
2. because judges exercise their authority independently of
the others, they are more like single-office holders than
members of a multi-member body;69
3. the State has a "compelling interest in linking jurisdiction
and elective base for judges acting alone"; 70 and
62. See id. at 422.
63. See id. Eight of the nine challenged districts comprised a single county;
the ninth comprised two counties. See id. The number of judges in the chal-
lenged districts ranged from a high of 59 to a low of three. See id.
64. See id. at 422-24.
65. See id. at 425.
66. Id. at 425-27.
67. League of United Latin Ain Citizens v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 649-
51 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (LULAC II) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
68. See Houston Lawyers'Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 424.
69. See id.
70. Id. As opposed, for example, to appellate judges who may have state-
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4. attempting to break the link between jurisdiction and elec-
tive base may result in a few judges being principally ac-
countable to a minority electorate rather than making all
judges at least partially responsible to the minority, thereby
decreasing rather than increasing minority influence.7'
Although the majority "deliberately avoid[ed] any evaluation of
the merits" of these concerns, 72 it stated that these
are matters that are relevant either to an analysis of the to-
tality of the circumstances that must be considered in an
application of the results test embodied in § 2 ... or to a
consideration of possible remedies in the event a violation
is proved . . . . [The] State's interest in maintaining an
electoral system-in these cases, Texas' interest in main-
taining the link between a district judge's jurisdiction and
the area of residency of his or her voters-is a legitimate
factor to be considered by courts among the "totality of cir-
cumstances" in determining whether a § 2 violation has oc-
curred. A State's justification for its electoral system is a
proper factor for the courts to assess in' a racial vote dilution
inquiry .... 73
wide jurisdiction although they are elected from districts (as was the case with
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Chisom), and who act collegially. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 426.
73. Id. at 426-27. At the end of its opinion, the Court reiterated that it was
remanding the case "because the concerns expressed by Judge Higginbotham
in distinguishing elections of Texas district court judges from elections of su-
preme court justices" were pertinent to the issues of the existence of a vote di-
lution violation and any remedy. Id. at 428. The identification of two issues to
which these concerns might be relevant has led to somewhat divergent analy-
ses by different courts of appeals. The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have
analyzed the interests in linking a judge's territorial jurisdiction and the
boundaries of the district from which the judge is elected as part of the totality
of the circumstances test in determining whether impermissible vote dilution
has occurred. See infra text accompanying notes 118-33, 213-18. In contrast
the Eleventh Circuit has analyzed these interests as part of the determination of
whether the plaintiffs seek an appropriate remedy after impermissible vote di-
lution has been found. See infra text accompanying notes 140-212.
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C. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Attorney General
of Texas
Following the Supreme Court's decision, this case went through
both a panel of the Fifth Circuit and a further rehearing en banc. In
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clement, 74 Judge Hig-
ginbotham wrote the majority opinion, which ran fifty-four pages in
the Federal Reporter.75 It addressed a number of issues which are
significant to the purposes of this Article.
1. Scope of the Attorney General's authority to settle the case over
the defendant's and intervenors' objections
Following the Supreme Court's decision, a panel of the Fifth
Circuit had upheld plaintiff s challenges to eight of the nine districts
involved.76 The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en bane and vacated
the panel's decision. 77 However, the Texas Attorney General urged a
legislative solution which would have required amending the Texas
Constitution.78 Because he anticipated the possibility that there
would be insufficient legislative support-which in fact turned out to
be the case-the Attorney General attempted to accomplish the same
result without the legislature by drafting a proposed settlement
agreement, which was objected to by the judicial defendant and two
judges who were intervenors. 79  The Attorney General tried to
74. 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane) [hereinafter LULAC IV], cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
75. With the one concurring and three dissenting opinions, the case totals
96 printed pages.
76. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728
(5th Cir. 1993) (LULAC Ill).
77. See LULAC1V, 999 F.2d at 839.
78. See id.
79. See id. Although individual judges have successfully sought to inter-
vene in Voting Rights Act cases, and a few have been named in some specific
official capacity, it appears that only one case has required that all sitting
judges be made parties if they may be affected by the remedy sought In Wil-
liams v. State Board of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. Ill. 1988), plaintiffs
challenged the at-large system for electing Illinois Supreme Court, Appellate
Court, and Circuit Court judges. The named defendants' motion to dismiss ar-
gued that sitting judges were indispensable parties with a unique interest in the
outcome of the suit because the plaintiffs were seeking to have all judicial po-
sitions elected from any part of Cook County declared vacant or to shorten the
statutory terms of office of the incumbents. The district court agreed and
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end-run the judicial officers by having the plaintiffs voluntarily dis-
miss the judicial defendant and by structuring the plan so that the
districts of the two objecting intervenor judges would not be
changed, thereby attempting to deny them standing to object.80 He
then moved the Fifth Circuit to remand the case for entry of the set-
tlement in the district court.81
The Attorney General argued that he was the exclusive lawyer
for the State, that in this role he was sole arbiter of the State's inter-
est in litigation, and that he did not need to represent the State's pol-
icy makers; he could ignore them and impose his own views.82 The
Fifth Circuit emphatically rejected this argument.83 Relying on
Texas state law and its prior decisions involving other attempts by
the Attorney General to make a policy decision unilaterally on behalf
of all who might be affected, the court held that the Attorney Gen-
eral's responsibility was to represent state agencies and officials; he
could not ignore his clients and bind them against their wishes.
84
chose to allow them to be added as a class of defendants rather than as indi-
viduals. See Williams, 696 F. Supp. at 1570-73. Several weeks later, in Wil-
liams v. State Board of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Iln. 1988), the dis-
trict court certified five separate classes of judges and judicial candidates. See
Williams, 696 F. Supp. at 1576-78. Ultimately, the defendants were granted
summary judgment See Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 718 F. Supp.
1324, 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
80. See LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 839.
81. See id. at 839-40.
82. See id. at 840.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 840-43; see also Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 848 F.
Supp. 1548, 1562 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (stating that the Georgia Attorney General
has authority to settle cases, as long as it is not in contravention of the wishes
of his or her client or of the law).
The Attorney General's late challenge to the status of two judges as in-
tervenors was also rejected. They had intervened in their personal capacities
and retained their own counsel long before they played "an important role at
trial" and on appeal, and the district court had originally found them to have
been elected illegally. LULAC IV, 999 F.2d at 844. While the Fifth Circuit
mentioned (but did not find it necessary to resolve) the possibility that they
also had standing in their official capacities, there was clearly standing to in-
tervene to protect their interests as judges, lawyers, and as a registered voters.
See id. at 844-45.
This decision on intervention should be contrasted with the attempt by
Sarah Flores to intervene in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th
Cir. 1990). She was denied leave to intervene because she did so belatedly
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The Fifth Circuit also refused to remand the case for entry of a
settlement as requested by the Attorney General. 5 It emphasized
that the court is not a rubber stamp, and stated:
Because the consent decree does not merely validate a
compromise but, by virtue of its injunctive provisions,
reaches into the future and has continuing effect, its terms
require more careful scrutiny. Even when it affects only the
parties, the court should, therefore, examine it carefully to
ascertain not only that it is a fair settlement but also that it
does not put the court's sanction on and power behind a
decree that violates Constitution, statute or jurisprudence. .
. If the decree also affects third parties, the court must be
satisfied that the effect on them is neither unreasonable nor
proscribed.
86
Moreover, intervenors who do not consent cannot be bound by a
consent decree; properly raised intervenor's claims remain and may
be litigated by the intervenor.
87
Finally, the Fifth Circuit noted that "Courts must be especially
cautious when parties seek to achieve by consent decree what they
cannot achieve by their own authority. Consent is not enough when
litigants seek to grant themselves powers they do not hold outside of
court., 8
(two years after the action had been filed, and four months after she declared
her candidacy for County Supervisor), despite being on notice that the redis-
tricting remedy sought could affect the outcome of the election. See id. at 777.
She also apparently failed to show that the interests she claimed to advocate
either were not adequately represented or were sufficiently substantial to re-
quire her presence in the case. See id. at 776-77.
85. See LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 847.
86. Id. at 846 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. City of Mi-
ami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
87. See id.; Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986).
88. LULAC IV, 999 F.2d at 846. One example offered was a local govern-
ment attempting to use a consent decree to avoid a referendum required by
state law before issuing construction bonds. See id. By contrast, Chisom was
eventually resolved when the Louisiana legislature passed a statute to effectu-
ate a remedy which did not violate the State Constitution. The consent decree
resolved the suit in a manner consistent with state law. See id. at 847-48.
November 1999]
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELESLA WREVIEW
2. Analysis of racial bloc voting
The second major issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit involved
evidence of whether racial bloc voting existed. The court of appeals
pointed out that under Gingles, the test "is not whether white resi-
dents tend to vote as a bloc, but whether such bloc voting is 'legally
significant.' 89 At trial, the district court had held that plaintiffs only
needed to show that whites and blacks generally supported different
candidates to establish legally significant white bloc voting and had
refused to consider the nonracial causes for voting preferences of-
fered by the defendants. 90 The court of appeals held that the district
court's analysis was in error and required reversal. 9'
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendants that
Unless the tendency among minorities and whites to sup-
port different candidates, and the accompanying losses by
minority groups at the polls, are somehow tied to race,...
plaintiffs' attempt to establish legally significant white bloc
voting, and thus their vote dilution claim under § 2, must
fail.
92
The court of appeals noted that the protections of Section 2 only ex-
tend "to defeats experienced by voters 'on account of race or
color. '93 The court continued,
In holding that the failure of minority-preferred candidates
to receive support from a majority of whites on a regular
basis, without more, sufficed to prove legally significant ra-
cial bloc voting, the district court loosed § 2 from its racial
tether and fused illegal vote dilution and political defeat.
94
The Fifth Circuit explained that the approach adopted by the
district. court had been specifically rejected by the majority in Gin-
gles.95 It went on to analyze the cases, including Whitcomb v.
89. Id. at 850 (quoting Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 55 (1986)).
90. See id. The defendants were apparently able to preserve their evidence
in the trial record despite the district judge's refusal to consider it
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 850-51, 855-59. On this point, the majority was composed of
Justices White, O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger. See
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Chavis96 and White v. Regester,97 that Senate Report 41798 indicated
were intended to be codified by the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act.99 The court of appeals concluded that evidence that di-
vergent voting patterns might be the result of partisan affiliation or
other perceived interests-as opposed to racel'0 -was highly proba-
tive on the issue of whether a minority group may be successful in
future elections and hence to the question of whether racial bloc
voting existed.' 0 '
96. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
97. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
98. SENATE REPORT 417, supra note 8, at 2, 20-23, 32-33.
99. See LULAC IV, 999 F.2d at 851-54. According to the Fifth Circuit's
analysis of Whitcomb, partisan affiliation rather than race was the predominant
factor in black electoral defeats. The fact that a white Republican majority
generally outvoted black (and white) Democrats in a Republican majority dis-
trict was not of constitutional significance where the black residents "did not
suffer from a lack of access to the political process." Id. at 851-52. The evi-
dence indicated that blacks had been nominated by both parties, some had been
elected, and they lost only when their entire party slate was defeated. See id. at
853 (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 109 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
In contrast, the court of appeals pointed out that the plaintiffs in White
had proven that black voters in Dallas County and Hispanic voters in Bexar
County "each established that they had been effectively excluded from the po-
litical processes leading to the nomination and election" of Texas state repre-
sentatives. Id. at 852-53.
100. As the Seventh Circuit cautioned in Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v.
Thompson, 116 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997), "[w]hat turns out to be related to
race is not easy to know, however." Milwaukee NAACP, 116 F.3d at 1199.
101. See LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 858-59 & n.26. The court of appeals noted
that an issue existed concerning which factors might actually be at work and
how they might factor into partisan affiliation; these factors, it suggested,
might require a detailed multivariate analysis. See id. A second issue was who
should carry the burden and expense of proof: plaintiff to disprove other ex-
planations or defendants to disprove a racial basis. See id. However, the court
of appeals concluded that resolution of these issues was unnecessary in the
case before it because the evidence clearly showed that partisan political af-
filiation was the dominant factor in explaining election outcomes. See id. at
859-61.
The Eleventh Circuit has approached this question slightly differently. In
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (en banc) (11th Cir. 1994), the court said that,
"if the evidence shows, under the totality of the circumstances, that the com-
munity is not motivated by racial bias in its voting patterns, then a case of vote
dilution has not been made [out]." Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1515 (plurality opinion).
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has been assiduous in analyzing not only
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The Fifth Circuit also specifically rejected the suggestion of the
United States, as amicus, that partisan affiliation or a divergence of
interests-including divergence based on socioeconomic status-
was irrelevant to the existence of racial bloc voting. 0 2 The United
States argued that divergence of interests is often the result of socio-
economic status, which in turn might be the product of past discrimi-
nation, and allowing divergence of interests to be a factor would viti-
ate the Senate Report 417 factor relating to the impact of low
socioeconomic status on the minority group's level of participa-
tion. 10 3 The court of appeals pointed out that Senate Report 417's
factor on the effect of past discrimination went to whether the mi-
nority's ability to participate in the political process had been hin-
dered, not to whether bloc voting existed.
10 4
who the preferred minority candidate was (including minority voting patterns,
race of the candidates and opponents, and partisan endorsements) in individual
judicial elections, but also the individual factors which may have affected the
outcome, such as length of residency, community ties, judicial qualification
rating, perceived position on non-judicial issues, and so forth. See, e.g., id. at
1501-09; see also Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions, 56
F.3d 1281, 1290-93 (llth Cir. 1995) (enbanc).
The Seventh Circuit likewise has reviewed in detail all the circumstances
relating to particular elections. In Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Thomp-
son, the court discussed and warned about the many variables which may af-
fect particular contests, and even the decision to run. See Milwaukee NAACP,
116 F.3d at 1196-99. As it noted, "[d]rawing inferences from voting patterns
is hazardous, because a combination of voters and candidates decides elec-
tions-and candidates' choices may mask the inclinations of the electorate."
Id. at 1198. "IT]he circumstances of individual elections.., matter to the to-
tality-of-circumstances inquiry even if not to the threshold case, and in princi-
ple they are relevant to the threshold case as well." Id. at 1199.
In Magnolia Bar Ass'n v. Lee, 994 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1993), the court of
appeals specifically rejected the argument that, because a black judge was an
incumbent against a white challenger, the outcome of the election should be
disregarded. See Magnolia BarAss'n, 994 F.2d at 1149. In addition, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that it was not permissible for the plaintiffs to try to satisfy
their burden to prove racial bloc voting in a particular district (there, the Cen-
tral (Judicial) District) by reference to voting statistics in a different, hypo-
thetical district (in that case, to the state of Mississippi as a whole). See id. at
1150-51.
102. See LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 862-63.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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3. Other vote dilution issues
The Fifth Circuit also addressed a number of issues relevant to
vote dilution claims. These included: (1) whether different racial or
ethnic minority groups could be combined; (2) whether the number
of minority lawyers could be considered in evaluating judicial races;
and (3) whether past discrimination alone proves present inability to
participate in the political process.'05
The plaintiffs contended that in those counties where both
blacks and Hispanics alleged dilution, their voting strength could be
treated together; however, in those counties where only blacks al-
leged vote dilution, they should be treated separately.10 6 The court of
appeals rejected this argument and concluded that where blacks and
Hispanics voted cohesively, they should be treated as a single mi-
nority group for purposes of determining whether there is a viable
minority candidate.' 0 7 Thus, either a black versus white or a His-
panic versus white race was relevant in evaluating the dilution claim,
if in that county blacks and Hispanics in fact tended to vote cohe-
sively.'
08
Next, the court of appeals addressed the issue related to the de-
gree to which the percentage of minority lawyers in the population
was relevant to the election of minority judges to the district court.109
The evidence showed that the percentage of minority lawyers in all
of the counties was much smaller than the percentage of minority
voters and that the percentage of minority judges was higher than
their percentage among all eligible lawyers." 0 Since Gingles re-
quires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances with a
105. See id. at 863-68.
106. See id. at 864.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 863-65. The concurring opinion questioned the significance
of the majority's analysis of this issue. "Although the en banc majority opin-
ion adopt[ed] the minority coalition theory for certain aspects of its analysis,
those points [were] not essential to its result and simply demonstrate that the
plaintiffs' own arguments are self-contradictory." Id. at 894 n.1 (Jones, J.,
concurring).
109. See id. at 865. Texas's eligibility requirements for the office of district
judge included four years' experience as a licensed attorney in the state, and
two years' residence in the district. See id.
110. See id.
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"'functional view' of the political process,""' the Fifth Circuit ob-
served that, "[tihe cold reality is that few minority citizens can run
for and be elected to judicial office" and "[a] functional analysis of
the electoral system must recognize the impact of limited pools of
eligible candidates on the number of minority judges that has re-
sulted."'" 2 The court of appeals concluded:
Plaintiffs cannot emphasize the scarcity of successful mi-
nority candidates to support the inference of dilution and
simultaneously urge that the number of minorities eligible
to run is not relevant. Plaintiffs argue that this factor may
not be considered because the limited number of minority
lawyers was caused by state discrimination in education.
We are not persuaded this argument merits exclusion of the
evidence. The Voting Rights Act responds to practices that
impact voting; it is not a panacea addressing social defi-
ciencies. '13
Finally, the court addressed the issue related to how evidence of
past discrimination should be evaluated. While evidence of past dis-
crimination was undisputed," 4 the court of appeals concluded that
these facts alone did not show "these effects of past discrimination
actually hamper the ability of minorities to participate" in the politi-
cal process." 5 While a plaintiff need not prove a direct causal nexus
between socioeconomic status and reduced participation, the plaintiff
must prove the fact of reduced participation in the political proc-
ess." 6 Evidence that poverty and lack of education generally depress
levels of political participation is not a substitute for proof that
111. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45.
112. LULACIV, 999 F.2dat 865.
113. Id. at 866.
114. See id. As the court found,
Texas's long history of discrimination against its black and Hispanic
citizens in all areas of public life is not the subject of dispute among
the parties. Nor has anyone questioned plaintiffs assertion that dis-
parities between white and minority residents in several socioeco-
nomic categories are the tragic legacies of the State's discriminatory
practices.
Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 867.
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minority voters in the particular case failed to participate equally in
the political process.
117 -
4. Texas's interest in linking jurisdiction and electoral bases
In Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas," 8 the
Supreme Court clearly indicated that Texas's interest in maintaining
a link between electoral and jurisdictional bases was a legitimate
factor to be weighed against other relevant factors in determining
whether the interest "outweigh[s] proof of racial vote dilution."" 9
As the Fifth Circuit phrased it, "[t]he issue we face is determining
when the linkage... will outweigh other factors and defeat liability
under § 2."120 The court of appeals rejected both extremes: that the
linkage interest always defeated liability; and that it never defeated
liability. 121
The Fifth Circuit pointed out that Texas's interest in the elec-
toral scheme was not tenuous, 22 but instead advanced "objectively
substantive goals."'123 The weight or substantiality of that interest
was to be determined not as a matter of fact but of law. "A substan-
tial state interest is not inherently preclusive of dilution and is not
raised to disprove the existence of dilution. Rather, the state's inter-
est is weighed against proven dilution to assess whether such dilu-
tion creates § 2 liability."'
2 4
The Fifth Circuit explored the nature of Texas's interest in the
link between the jurisdiction and electoral bases of its district
courts. 21 It explained:
117. See id. at 866-68. The evidence did not show reduced levels of black
voter registration or turnout, although Hispanic registration was lower. The
evidence also did not show that black or Hispanic candidates had difficulty
raising adequate funds for their campaigns. See id. at 867-68.
118. 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
119. Id. at427.
120. LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 870.
121. See id. at 870-71.
122. That is, its interest was "not a pretext masking discriminatory intent in
the adoption or maintenance of the scheme." Id. at 870.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 871.
125. See id. at 868-69. District judges in Texas had been elected since 1850,
and their areas of primary jurisdiction had always been linked to their electoral
bases, both of which are drawn along the political boundaries of the counties.
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By making coterminous the electoral and jurisdictional
bases of trial courts, Texas advances the effectiveness of its
courts by balancing the virtues of accountability with the
need for independence. The state attempts to maintain the
fact and appearance of judicial fairness that are central to
the judicial task, in part, by insuring that judges remain ac-
countable to the range of people within their jurisdiction. A
broad base diminishes the semblance of bias and favoritism
towards the parochial interests of a narrow constituency.
Appearances are critical because "the very perception of
impropriety and unfairness undermines the moral authority
of the courts."'
126
This structure "advances the state's substantial interest in judicial ef-
fectiveness," and "balances accountability and judicial independ-
ence."'
127
The court of appeals later elaborated on this theme:
The decision to make jurisdiction and electoral bases co-
terminous is more than a decision about how to elect state
judges. It is a decision of what constitutes a state court
judge. Such a decision is as much a decision about the
structure of the judicial office as the office's explicit quali-
fications such as bar membership or the age of judges. The
collective voice of generations by their unswerving
adherence to the principle of linkage through times of
Since 1861, the Texas Constitution has called for all voters in a county to elect
all the district judges in that county. In their judicial capacity, each judge acts
alone, although they may act collegially in certain administrative matters. See
id.
126. Id. at 869 (quoting John L. Hill, Jr., Taking Texas Judges Out of Poli-
tics: An Argument for Merit Election, 40 BAYLORL. REv. 339, 364 (1988)).
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer has articulated a similar posi-
tion,
... [T]he State of California has a strong interest in preserving strict
linkage between a trial court's jurisdiction and its election constitu-
ency, such that all voters within a court's jurisdiction are entitled to
vote for the judge(s) thereof
Letter from Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, to Victor E. Chavez,
Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, at 1 (Sept. 21, 1999) (on
file with the Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review).
127. LULACNI, 999 F.2d at 868.
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extraordinary growth and change speaks to us with power.
Tradition, of course, does not make right of wrong, but we
must be cautious when asked to embrace a new revelation
that right has so long been wrong. There is no evidence
that linkage was created and consistently maintained to sti-
fle minority votes.
The distrust of judicial subdistricts does not rest on
paternalism. It recognizes Texas'[s] historic interest in
having district judges remain accountable to all voters in
their districts. Regardless of the race or residency of par-
ticular litigants, judges make choices that affect all county
residents. Texas has insisted that trial judges answer to all
county voters at the ballot box.
12
In evaluating the evidence of vote dilution-which was at best
weak in the various counties--the court of appeals noted that the
evidence showed that a greater percentage of minority lawyers were
elected than were in the eligible population. 129 This fact alone did
not prove that there was no illegal dilution, but the greatest disparity
lay between the minority population and the number of minorities
eligible to serve as judges.130 While the latter fact may cast light on
other societal issues, the Fifth Circuit explained that it does not illu-
minate whether minorities have been denied voting rights.13 ' Parti-
san politics, not race, was the overwhelming reason why minority
candidates won or lost. 132 Even if the court of appeals could sustain
the district court's findings on vote dilution-which it could not-
128. Id. at 872-73. The Fifth Circuit analyzed whether minority groups' in-
terests would actually be served by destroying linkage and concluded they
would not. If judges were elected from sub-districts there would be no guar-
antee that a minority group member would have his or her case heard by a
judge he or she had voted for, and most judges would then have little or no di-
rect political interest in being responsive to that individual's concerns. See id.
The court of appeals also noted that the solutions suggested by the plain-
tiffs would likely require drastic changes in venue rules, assignment of judges,
and jury selection procedures. See id. at 875-76.
129. See id. at 893.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
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the evidence on vote dilution was far outweighed by the state's inter-
est in linkage.
133
5. The concurring opinion
Concurring in the majority opinion, Judge Jones, joined by four
other judges, wrote to address an issue which was not specifically re-
solved by the majority: "whether different racial or language minor-
ity groups may be permitted to aggregate their strength in order to
pursue a Section 2 vote dilution claim." 134 She concluded they
should not.
135
As Judge Jones analyzed the issue, aggregation of the strength
of diverse ethnic and language minorities had the effect of changing
the focus of the Voting Rights Act "from a statute that levels the
playing field for all races to one that forcibly advances contrived in-
terest-group coalitions of racial or ethnic minorities."' 36 The two de-
cisions which had accepted minority coalitions 37 did so without
133. See id. at 876-77, 893-94. The court of appeals' county-by-county re-
view of the evidence contains a detailed analysis of the election results. See id.
at 877-93.
134. Id. at 894 (Jones, J., concurring).
135. See id. (Jones, J., concurring).
136. Id. (Jones, J., concurring).
137. See Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244, reh'g denied,
849 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1988); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Midland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. 596, 606 (W.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd, 812 F.2d
1494, aff'd in part on other grounds, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
Judge Jones's opinion cites several cases from five different federal cir-
cuits, including Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1992),
and Romero v. City of Pomona, 665 F. Supp. 853, 859 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aJJ'd,
883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989), where the possibility of minority coalition
claims was apparently assumed, but the specific claims in those cases were re-
jected on the facts. See LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 897 (Jones, J., concurring); see
also DeBaca v. County of San Diego, 794 F. Supp. 990, 998-1000 (S.D. Cal.
1992) (rejecting, on the facts, the alleged cohesiveness of blacks, Hispanics,
and Asian-Americans).
The issue raised by Judge Jones's concurrence in LULAC IV was
squarely addressed by the Sixth Circuit two and one-half years later. In Nixon
v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), the plaintiffs sought to aggregate
Hispanic and black citizens, who totaled 10.8 percent of the county and 9.2
percent of the voting age population, for the purpose of proving a vote dilution
claim under Section 2. See id. at 1384. The Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, re-
viewed the text of the statute, the legislative history, other judicial decisions,
and the various policy concerns, and expressly rejected the aggregation of mi-
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looking at Congress's intent and without relying on more than a
commonly brought lawsuit and a willingness to work together in
specific instances. 38 In Judge Jones's view, "[e]nlarging the permis-
sible boundaries of Section 2 relief to encompass minority coalitions
... runs headlong into the Section 2 prohibition of proportional rep-
resentation ... ,,139
D. Decisions Involving Weighing the Interests to Fashion Remedies
The Eleventh Circuit has authored many of the most significant
decisions concerning what remedies may be available in vote dilu-
tion cases involving judicial elections. The starting point to under-
stand these decisions is the principle that it is part of the plaintiffs
prima facie case under Section 2 to demonstrate a proper remedy.
140
The failure to demonstrate an appropriate remedy will lead to a
judgment for the defendant even if the plaintiff shows vote dilution.
nority groups in "coalition" suits. See id. at 13 86-92.
An interesting variation was presented in Meek v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 908 F.2d 1540 (1lth Cir. 1990). Black and Hispanic voters challenged
an at-large voting scheme in Dade County as diluting their votes. Non-Latin
whites comprised about 37 percent of the population and 48.67 percent of the
registered voters; Hispanics comprised about 43 percent of the population and
about 32.96 percent of the registered voters; and blacks comprised about 20
percent of the population and 18.37 percent of the registered voters. See Meek,
908 F.2d at 1541. The district court had found what it described as "keen hos-
tility" between blacks and Hispanics, such that either would vote for a non-
Latin white rather than the other's candidate. See id. at 1544-46. The court of
appeals ruled that under these circumstances the bloc voting majority could be
composed of blacks and non-Latin whites to show dilution of Hispanic votes
and could be composed of Hispanics and non-Latin whites to show dilution of
black votes. See id. at 1544-47. However, there are analytical gaps in the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion, and it is not clear how that analysis would work if
someone attempted to apply it in Los Angeles County, where there are at least
four significant racial or ethnic groups.
138. See LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 894-95.
139. Id. at 896.
140. See Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1419-24 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Davis v. Bush, 119 S. Ct. 1139 (1999); Southern Christian
Leadership Conference v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1289, 1294-97 (11th Cir.
1995) (en banc); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1530-31 (1lth Cir. 1994) (en
bane) (plurality opinion); id. at 1547 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
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1. Nipper v. Smith
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Nipper v. Smith14 1 is impor-
tant because the election system for trial court judges at issue had
many features in common with Los Angeles County. Florida circuit
courts are trial courts of general jurisdiction, with judges elected for
a six-year term. 42 County courts are trial courts of limited jurisdic-
tion, with judges elected for a four-year term. 43 All the trial judges
are elected in non-partisan, at-large, district-wide elections.144 These
elections are for numbered posts, with staggered terms, and a major-
ity vote is required. 45 Candidates must live in the court district to
which they seek election, and they must have been members in good
standing of the Florida Bar for at least five years immediately prior
to running. 146 The Governor fills mid-term vacancies by appoint-
ment.' 47 Appointed judges must stand for reelection at the next gen-
eral election.'
48
After finding vote dilution on the facts before it, the court of ap-
peals analyzed the alternative remedies suggested by the plaintiffs. 1
49
Plaintiffs' first, and apparently preferred, remedy was the creation of
electoral sub-districts, retaining the existing circuit-wide or county-
wide territorial jurisdiction. 50 However, the Eleventh Circuit saw
several flaws with this plan. First, it would sever the historical link
between election base and jurisdiction which ensured judicial ac-
countability to all the people.' 5' Second, it would disenfranchise
every voter outside the subdistrict. 52 Third, it would leave minority
voters with no say in the election of the majority of judges, who
would then have little direct political interest in responding to the
141. 39 F.3d 1494 (llth Cir. 1994) (en bane).
142. See id. at 1498.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1499.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. Another similarity is the fact that if the incumbent is not op-
posed, his or her name does not even appear on the ballot. See id. at 1502
n.12; see also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8203 (West 1995).
149. See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1542.
150. See id. at 1543-45.
151. See id. at 1543.
152. See id.
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minority's concerns.' 53 Fourth, it would compromise judicial inde-
pendence.54 Fifth, because of residency requirements, it would nar-
row the pool of eligible candidates under Florida's version of the
"Missouri Plan."' 55  The court of appeals concluded that having
black judges primarily accountable to the black section of their dis-
trict, and white judges primarily accountable to the white section of
their district, "would be detrimental to [the] pattern of fair and im-
partial justice," and thus rejected the proposal.
56
The plaintiffs' second proposal was to carve out an entirely new
circuit representing part of one county with a black majority popula-
tion. 57 While this remedy would preserve the linkage interest, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that it would require a modification of Flor-
ida's venue rules and would alter the composition of jury pools. 58
The creation of separate black and white jurisdictions would also
result in the establishment of a system of separate justice based on
race but no neutral forum when the litigants were of different
races.' 59 This, too, was unacceptable.
160
The third proposed remedy was a cumulative voting system'
6'
which would require abandonment of the numbered post system, and
all the judges standing for reelection would be required to run against
each other.162 The Eleventh Circuit also found this proposal objec-
tionable. It would have a detrimental effect on collegiality in ad-ministrative matters and would decrease judicial independence, since
the judges would be running for reelection from the moment they
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1544.
155. See id. The "Missouri Plan" is a procedure for merit-based selection of
state court judges through the use of nominating commissions to recommend
candidates for appointment by the Governor. It was originally adopted by
Missouri in 1940 and was later copied by approximately 30 states. See id. at
1500-01 & n.11.
156. Id. at 1543-45.
157. See id. at 1545. Since the Florida Constitution requires that county
court boundaries follow county lines, the creation of new county courts by this
means would require the creation of new counties. See id. at 1545 n.92.
158. See id. at 1545 nn.93-94.
159. See id. at 1545.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1545-46.
162. See id. at 1545.
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took office. 163 It would also reduce lawyer interest in a judicial ca-
reer by forcing them to compete against all sitting judges and by re-
ducing the power of incumbency (and hence the expectation of sta-
bility once elected), thereby reducing the pool of qualified
applicants. 164 It would encourage, rather than discourage, racial bloc
voting.165 Finally, it would be antithetical to the merit selection plan
for two reasons. First, merit selection "insulates judges from popular
pressure and facilitates impartial decision-making in controversial
cases."'166 Second, merit selection "helps a qualified individual who
lacks political clout or voter recognition both to obtain and to retain a
judgeship.' 67  Cumulative voting would compromise both of these
objectives.
In summary, the court of appeals found that each of plaintiffs'
remedial proposals conflicted with strong state interests which were
unique to judicial elections. 168 Because each of the suggested reme-
dies "would have the effect of undermining the court's ability to ad-
minister justice,' ' 169 the district court's order denying the plaintiffs
163. See id. at 1546.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 1547.
169. Id. The single factor the court of appeals identified in support of any of
the remedies was that altering the electoral scheme to allow blacks to elect
more black justices would increase their perception that the courts were color-
blind. See id. at 1546. At the same time, by adopting any of these remedies,
the federal court "would be proclaiming that race matters in the administration
ofjustice." Id. As the court stated:
The case at hand, therefore, presents a remedial paradox: A remedy
designed to foster a perception of fhirness in the administration ofjus-
tice would likely create, by the public policy statement it would make,
perceptions that undermine that very ideal. In the eyes of the public
and litigants, at least, justice would not remain colorblind.
Id. (citations omitted).
The panel in Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414 (11th Cir. 1998), took issue
with this statement. Because it found judicial races in the case before it to be
"racially polarized" already, it regarded the possible substitution of a different
set of racial sensitivities for existing ones a neutral factor, which weighed nei-
ther for nor against the plaintiff's proposed remedy. Davis, 139 F.3d at 1422-
23.
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relief was affirmed. 170
2. Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions
The decision in Southern Christian Leadership Conference v.
Sessions'7' arose out of a challenge to Alabama's method of electing
trial judges. Circuit courts are trial courts of general jurisdiction,
each encompassing one or more whole counties. 172 District courts
are trial courts of limited jurisdiction, each of which encompasses a
single whole county. 73 Judges run for numbered posts in at-large,
partisan elections encompassing their entire circuit or district.
174
Twelve months' local residency 175 and membership in the Alabama
Bar 176 are required.
Plaintiffs challenged two aspects of the election scheme: (1) the
combination of numbered posts and at-large elections, and (2) the ju-
dicial circuit boundary lines. 177 They sought to have the judicial
boundaries realigned 78 and to create a series of subdistricts within
counties to ensure the election of blacks to office. 179 Plaintiffs ac-
knowledged these remedies would disenfranchise the voters who re-
sided outside of the new electoral districts and would eliminate the
linkage between the judges' territorial jurisdiction and their electoral
base.'8
170. See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1547 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
171. 56 F.3d 1281 (llth Cir. 1995) (enbane).
172. See id. at 1284. Venue and jury selection are based on counties and
most court business is at the county level. See id. at 1284 n.4.
173. See id. at 1284.
174. See id. at 1285. At-large elections date from 1850; numbered posts
from 1927. See id. at 1285-86.
175. See id. at 1285 n.8.
176. See id. at 1286. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion details both the slow
admission of blacks to practice law in Alabama and their numbers in various
districts. See id. at 1286-87, 1296.
177. See id. at 1289.
178. See id. "The Alabama legislature, with the advice of the Alabama Su-
preme Court, has the authority to change the number and the boundaries of the
circuits." Id. at 1284 n.3.
179. See id. at 1289. Plaintiffs specifically did not seek to impose cumula-
tive voting, acknowledging the pernicious effects it could create. See id. at
1296 n.24.
180. See id. at 1289.
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The court of appeals analyzed the proposed remedy in substan-
tially the same manner it had in Nipper v. Smith. It concluded that
the disenfranchisement and linkage issues,' the tendency for race to
become the "linchpin" of the judicial system,182 the relatively limited
pool of eligible minority lawyers, and the increased sensitivity to
pressure by a limited group of voters and consequent decreased judi-
cial independence, ' 3 made the proposed remedies unacceptable.'
8 4
The state policy interests in the present system of electing judges
outweighed whatever possible vote dilution had been shown by the
evidence.' 85
3. Davis v. Chiles
In Davis v. Chiles,186 as in Nipper v. Smith, the Eleventh Circuit
addressed a challenge to Florida's trial court elections. 18 7 In Davis,
the plaintiffs proposed a modified subdistricting plan, which would
divide the at-large judicial circuits into a combination of single- and
multi-member subdistricts, where there would be competitive post-
numbered elections. 88 The successful subdistrict candidates would
then face a circuit-wide retention election by all citizens over whom
they would exercise jurisdiction. 8 9 If any candidate from a subdis-
trict did not receive majority support in a retention election, the post
would be deemed vacant for the Governor to make an appoint-
ment.1
9 0
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the proposed plan and affirmed
the district court's judgment for the defendants.' 9' The court pointed
out that "[i]n assessing a plaintiffs proposed remedy, a court must
look to the totality of the circumstances, weighing both the state's
181. See id. at 1295-97.
182. See id. at 1295.
183. See id. at 1294.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. 139 F.3d 1414 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1139 (1999).
187. See id. at 1416. The structure of the courts was identical to that in Nip-
per v. Smith. The court of appeals also noted that these districts had a history
of racially polarized voting. See id. at 1417-18.
188. See id. at 1418.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1426.
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interest in maintaining its election system and the plaintiffs interest
in the adoption of his suggested remedial plan." 192
An issue of great concern to the district court had been the ways
in which implementation of the proposed remedy conflicted with the
Florida Constitution. 193 The court of appeals reviewed these issues
individually, including infringement of the rights of some electors to
vote for their judges, the creation of a retention election system for
trial court judges where it was not authorized by constitution or stat-
ute, and the creation of new and different types of judicial districts
without constitutional or legislative sanction. 194  As the panel in
Davis acknowledged, Nipper requires that the court "carefully con-
sider the impact that any remedial proposal would have on the judi-
cial model enshrined in a state's constitution or statutes."' 95 Apply-
ing the weighing test, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs'
proposed remedy.' 96
192. Id. at 1419-20.
193. See id. at 1420. In contrast, Article VI, section 4 of the California Con-
stitution confers jurisdiction upon one superior court per county; Article VI,
section 5 defines the jurisdiction of municipal courts as encompassing one or
more districts within a county. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4-5. Article VI,
section 16 sets forth the procedures for at-large election of superior court and
municipal court judges from their respective jurisdictions. See id. § 16.
194. See Davis, 139 F.3d at 1420. A variation on this theme appeared in
Mallory v. Eyrich, 717 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Ohio 1989). After the district court
denied cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties attempted to resolve
the case by having some (but not all) of the defendants offer to allow judgment
on liability to be taken against them per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68
and have the court fashion a remedy. See Mallory, 717 F. Supp. at 541-42.
The district court characterized this as some parties having "simply determined
that this Court must exercise jurisdiction and remedy an asserted statutory
violation while denying the Court an opportunity to inquire whether a violation
does exist" Id. at 543. The district court declined to act without what it
thought was an appropriate basis, and deferred to the state legislature to fash-
ion a solution if it could do so. See id. at 544-45.
195. Davis, 139 F.3d at 1421.
196. See id. at 1423. The panel was troubled by its perception that, through
its decisions in Nipper v. Smith, Southern Christian Leadership Conference v.
Sessions, and White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 1996), the Eleventh
Circuit had effectively foreclosed any remedy that might be applied in a Sec-
tion 2 vote dilution case involving at-large judicial elections. See Davis, 139
F.3d at 1423-24.
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4. Brooks v. State Board of Elections and White v. Alabama
The issue of possible conflict between a remedial plan and a
state's constitution addressed by the Eleventh Circuit panel in Davis
v. Chiles also arose in Brooks v. State Board of Elections.'97 In
Brooks, the district court was asked to approve a consent decree to
settle the Section 2 claims raised in a multi-faceted challenge to
Georgia's judicial system 98 The proposed consent decree required
the establishment of a merit selection system for gubernatorial ap-
pointment of all new judges, with retention elections substituted for
the prior system of open elections. 99
The district court, however, rejected the proposed consent de-
cree because it "would violate the Georgia Constitution's require-
ment that judges be elected, impermissibly alter the structure of
power [as between the Governor, the voters, and qualified potential
candidates] currently embodied in the 1983 Georgia Constitution re-
garding the election of judges, and violate several fundamental
Georgia statutes."200 The court concluded that, in a situation where
there had been no judicial determination that the present system vio-
lated Section 2,201 and where there had been no voluntary amend-
ment to the Georgia Constitution and statutes, the court would not
approve a remedy that contravened existing Georgia law.202
Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the same issue
in White v. Alabama.203 Plaintiffs had challenged the at-large parti-
san election of Alabama's appellate judges under Section 2. Settle-
ment discussions began very early and resulted in a proposed consent
decree.04 As finally approved by the district court, the consent de-
cree preserved at-large elections, but provided that there be at least
two black justices on each of the appellate courts. Furthermore, if at
least two black justices were not elected, the governor should then
appoint them from a list prepared by a commission dominated by
197. 848 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
198. See id. at 1551-52.
199. See id. at 1563-64.
200. Id. at 1564.
201. The proposed consent decree specifically stated that the defendants
were making no admission of liability. See id. at 1581.
202. See id. at 1569.
203. 74F.3d 1058 (llthCir. 1996).
204. See id. at 1060-61.
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blacks, with the size of the appellate courts being temporarily in-
creased, and as white judges retired, their seats would then be abol-
ished to reduce the size of the court to the original level.2°5
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this de-
cision. 2°6 It began by observing that the essence of Section 2 was
protecting the plaintiffs' right to elect the candidates of their choice.
Since the proposed consent decree substituted appointment of judges
for election of judges, the remedy effectively eliminated the right to
vote; it thereby violated both the spirit and the purposes of the Vot-
ing Rights Act and therefore was a remedy foreclosed by the Voting
Rights Act.
207
As an equally fundamental issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the district court's order was improper because it lacked the authority
to require Alabama to increase the size of its appellate courts.
20 8
Citing Holder v. Hall,20 9 the court of appeals held that using
205. See id. at 1062-68.
206. See id. at 1075.
207. See id. at 1069-71. The court also held that specific minimum black
membership requirements were a guarantee of proportional representation in
violation of the express terms of Section 2. See id. at 1071-72.
208. See id. at 1072. That authority rested with the Alabama Legislature,
qualified by the fact that Alabama was subject to preclearance under Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act See id. at 1061.
The language added by Proposition 220 to Article VI, section 16(b)(1) of
the California Constitution, allowing the California Legislature (on a two-
thirds vote of each House) to provide for an alternative to countywide elections
of superior court judges, applies "as... necessary to meet the requirements of
federal law." CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16(b)(1). The use of the words, "neces-
sary to meet the requirements," suggests that a finding of liability for a Section
2 violation is the prerequisite to the Legislature's action, because it is only af-
ter a violation has been established that any alternative procedure can be found"necessary."
In a letter to Presiding Judge Victor Chavez of the Los Angeles Superior
Court, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer recently came to the same
conclusion. He opined that a federal court must first determine that some sys-
tem other than country-wide election of superior court judges is necessary to
comply with federal law before the legislature may change the county-wide
electoral system. Letter from Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, to
Victor E. Chavez, Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, at 2
(Sept 21, 1999) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
209. 512 U.S. 874 (1994). In Holder, the plaintiffs sought replacement of a
single commissioner system for county government, with a multi-member
commission of sufficient size to allow creation of at least one single-member
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proportional representation as a benchmark for a federal court to in-
crease the number of judges on a particular court was not permitted
under Section 2.210 Even treating the district court's order as a con-
sent decree,21 the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court could
not provide a remedy that was not authorized by the Voting Rights
Act.
212
E. Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Thompson
Discussions of what weight to give to the states' interests have
not been confined solely to the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. The
Seventh Circuit applied a fresh approach in Milwaukee Branch of the
district with a black representative. See id. at 878. Although not able to agree
on an opinion, five members of the Court agreed that the size of a governing
body could not be the subject of a vote dilution challenge because there is no
principled way for a court to choose among the possible sizes for such a body.
See id. at 880-85 (Kennedy, J., announcing the judgment), 885-91 (O'Connor,
J., concurring), 891-92 (Thomas, J., concurring).
210. See White, 74F.3dat 1072-73.
211. The Eleventh Circuit held it could not be a "consent decree" because
some parties objected to it See id. at 1073-74.
212. See id. at 1074-75. In a case which did not involve judicial elections,
the District of Columbia Circuit struck down a consent decree entered into
between the NAACP and a county government changing the structure of the
county's government because the procedures adopted violated the North Caro-
lina Constitution and statutes. See Cleveland County Ass'n for Gov't by the
People v. Board of Commr's, 142 F.3d 468, 469, 475-79 (D.C. Cir. 1998). As
in Brooks, the consent decree could not be upheld as correcting a violation of
federal law because there was no admission of liability. See id. at 477 & n.16.
Similarly, in Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212 (7th Cir.
1995), the court of appeals struck down a consent decree which changed the
form of local government without the referendum as required by Illinois state
law even though there was no finding of a Voting Rights Act violation. See
Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216-17. The court distinguished Perkins from a situation
where a Voting Rights Act violation had been found, in which case state law
could not prevent a necessary remedy. See id. at 216; see also Keith v. Volpe,
118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that parties to consent decree
which purported to ban billboards along the Century Freeway "could not agree
to terms which would exceed their authority and supplant state law").
The Supreme Court upheld a consent decree which implemented changes
in voting districts without a finding of liability in Lawyer v. Department of
Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997). The Florida Supreme Court drew-up the plan
following a legislative impasse-as permitted by Florida law-and both
houses of the Florida Legislature were parties and represented by the state At-
torney General. This was deemed to be equivalent to the state making its own
redistricting plan. See id. at 578.
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NAACP v. Thompson.2" 3 Plaintiffs had challenged an at-large elec-
tion system for both trial and appellate courts that involved elections
for numbered posts in an electoral district coextensive with the area
of primary jurisdiction-county-wide for trial judges and covering
several counties for appellate judges. The percentage of black judges
was substantially below the voting age black population but twice the
percentage of eligible black lawyers.214
The plaintiffs argued that the district court erred by giving any
weight to the state's interest in linking territorial jurisdiction and
electoral base. The Seventh Circuit analyzed each of the arguments
in favor of plaintiffs' assertion25 and found that "individually and
collectively they are not enough to overcome Wisconsin's interest in
electing its trial judges from whole counties." 216 It held:
At-large elections from the whole of the judge's geographic
jurisdiction are designed to balance accountability and in-
dependence....
Wisconsin believes that election of judges from sub-
districts would lead to a public perception (and perhaps the
actuality) that judges serve the interests of constituencies
defined by race or other socioeconomic conditions, rather
than the interest of the whole populace .... To free the
judge to follow the law dispassionately, Wisconsin prefers
to elect judges from larger areas, diluting the reaction to in-
dividual decisions .... [T]he Voting Rights Act does not
compel a state to disregard a belief that larger jurisdictions
promote impartial administration of justice, if that belief is
sincerely held-as the district judge concluded that it is in
Wisconsin.217
213. 116 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997).
214. See id. at 1196.
215. See id. at 1200-01.
216. Id. at 1201.
217. Id. The Sixth Circuit went even further in Cousin v. McWherter, 46
F.3d 568, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1995). While the district court had described Ten-
nessee's interest in maintaining an at-large, circuit wide system of electing trial
judges as tenuous and "nebulous at best," the court of appeals disagreed:
[W]e hold, as a matter of law, that Tennessee has a legitimate interest in pre-
serving its at-large system of electing trial judges and that this interest must be
weighed as a separate factor within the "totality of the circumstances" analysis
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The Seventh Circuit's decision is more closely akin to LULAC
IVthan it is to Nipper v. Smith and its progeny, because the court of
appeals' examination of Wisconsin's interests explicitly was part of
the totality of circumstances test, upholding a finding of no vote di-
lution, as opposed to being an analysis of the proposed remedy.2
F. Anthony v. Michigan and Trial Court Unification
The issue of the Voting Rights Act implications of trial court
unification was presented in the Eastern District of Michigan's recent
decision in Anthony v. Michigan. 9  Wayne County Circuit Court
was the trial court of general jurisdiction in Wayne County, handling
civil matters over $10,000 and felony criminal cases outside De-
troit.220 Its judges were elected at-large, in non-partisan county-wide
races.221 The Detroit Recorder's Court, although technically a mu-
nicipal court, functioned like a circuit court because it handled felony
cases occurring in the City of Detroit.222 Its judges were elected only
from within the City of Detroit. The circuit court was 80% white;
the Recorder's Court was 76% black.223 Since 1986, all judges of the
two courts were cross-assigned, and there were regular rotations of
circuit judges to hear cases in the Recorder's Court. 24
Since 1980, there had been a move away from local funding to-
ward complete state funding of all trial courts. 225 Wayne County re-
ceived state support first because of the county's financial problems,
but this was seen as a prelude to reorganization of the court structure
for greater efficiency. However, full implementation of state trial
in determining whether a Section 2 violation has occurred. Cousin, 46 F.3d at
576 (emphasis added).
218. SeeMilwaukeeNAACP, 116 F.3dat 1199-1201.
219. 35 F. Supp. 2d 989 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
220. See id. at 992.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 993. The district court described it as "an anachronism." Id.
It was the only municipal court in Michigan that handled felonies, and it was
the only municipal court that was funded by the state. See id. Wayne County
was the only county in Michigan that had, in effect, two circuit courts. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 994.
225. See id.
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court funding failed to pass the legislature.226 But, in 1996 legisla-
tion passed merging the Recorder's Court with the Wayne County
Circuit Court, effective October 1, 1997. This legislation also pro-
vided for all counties to receive state funding based on caseload.227
Finally, in anticipation of Voting Rights Act challenges, the legisla-
tion provided:
If the state constitution of 1963 permits the creation of
election districts in a county for countywide judicial office,
or if, by a final nonreviewable judgment, a court determines
that the federal voting rights act requires election districts
rather than at-large election for countywide judicial office,
the county board of commissioners has authority to create
election districts to conform with those requirements.228
The plaintiffs challenged the merger on both constitutional
229
and Voting Rights Act grounds. They alleged that, although the City
of Detroit's population was approximately 1,030,000, and 76% black
and 22% white, it would be difficult for blacks to be elected in
countywide judicial elections since Wayne County's population-
about 2,110,000-was 57% white and 40% black.
23 0
On the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district
court rejected this argument.2 3 It analyzed the evidence presented
by the three experts: one for plaintiffs, one for the defendant, and
one appointed by the court. The court concluded that the first two
tests of Thornburg v. Gingles2 32 were satisfied. First, the black
population was sufficiently numerous and geographically compact,
and second, whites tended to vote differently than blacks. Plaintiffs
failed the third test, however, because the evidence of blacks'
226. See id. at 994-95.
227. See id. at 996.
228. Id. at 997 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.9948 (West 1987)).
229. The constitutional claims were dismissed for lack of standing and other
defects. See id. at 1002-04. Therefore, they will not be discussed further.
However, the district court analyzed and specifically rejected plaintiffs' argu-
ment of a discriminatory intent behind the merger, finding that the merger
"was part of a larger effort to equitably fund the state's trial courts .... " Id. at
996-99, 1003-04.
230. See id. at 997-98.
231. See id. at 1002.
232. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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electoral success in Wayne County precluded a finding of "legally
significant" racial bloc voting, i.e., black-preferred judicial candi-
dates were not "generally," or "usually," or "normally" defeated in
countywide elections. 33 The evidence showed that eleven out of
eleven black-preferred incumbents were elected and four out of eight
black-preferred non-incumbents were elected. 3 The district court
held that, as a matter of law, these success rates precluded a finding
of "legally significant" racial bloc voting by the white majority.
235
V. CONCLUSION
The discussion above is not intended to be an encyclopedic
treatment of Section 2 jurisprudence--only a survey of some of the
decisions which might apply to litigation over judicial elections in
Los Angeles County. Nevertheless, several points are clear.
Since the 1982 amendments to Section 2, it is not necessary to
show an intent to discriminate; rather, discriminatory effect alone is
sufficient. However, electoral devices, such as at-large elections, are
not per se violative of Section 2. The plaintiffs have the burden to
demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, the elec-
toral procedures used result in unequal access to the electoral proc-
ess. The existence of an allegedly dilutive electoral procedure and
the lack of proportional representation alone do not establish a viola-
tion. Moreover, because it is the ability to vote that is at issue, the
relevant population for the purpose of ascertaining comparative vot-
ing strength is not all persons, but rather voting age citizens.
In addition, it is part of the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate
both that the minority votes cohesively, and that "legally significant"
racial bloc voting exists, whereby the majority is usually able to de-
feat the minority's preferred candidate. Ordinarily this is done by a
sophisticated statistical analysis of a number of elections in the dis-
trict at issue. Alternative non-racial explanations of voting results,
such as incumbency, partisan affiliations of the candidates, or other
factors influencing particular elections, can be offered to help inter-
pret the election results. This analysis is both complicated and very
233. See Anthony, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1004-05.
234. See id. at 1005.
235. See id. at 999-1002, 1004-06.
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expensive. Moreover, additional factors--such as the percentage of
eligible minority candidates in the population-are also relevant.
This analysis is difficult enough where only two significant ethnic
groups are involved, e.g., whites and blacks. Only a few cases ad-
dress the dynamics of three groups, and none have addressed a situa-
tion like Los Angeles County where there are at least four potentially
significant groups--whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians-none of
whom form a majority of the population. The complexity of the sta-
tistical analysis when more than two groups are involved is likely to
increase almost geometrically.
If and only if the plaintiffs are able to establish all three of their
prima facie elements do the courts employ a balancing test. The
Voting Rights Act itself does not articulate precisely what circum-
stances are relevant to the evaluation of the totality of circumstances.
Senate Report 417,236 which is the principal piece of legislative his-
tory to the 1982 amendments, sets forth the non-exclusive list of
factors cited by Justice Brennan in Gingles 7
In the context of judicial elections, a number of factors other
than those enumerated by Justice Brennan have been considered in
the totality of circumstances analysis. One of the principal factors is
the state's interest in maintaining its chosen election system, which
in judicial elections is often phrased in terms of "linkage." Linkage
is a state's decision to make the judge's jurisdictional base and elec-
toral base coextensive, i.e., a judge is elected by voters from
throughout the county, and his or her primary area of jurisdiction is
the entire county. Linkage is often described as an attempt to bal-
ance judicial independence and judicial accountability, and linkage
has long historical roots throughout the country. The federal courts
have emphatically recognized linkage as a strong, legitimate interest
which has independent weight within the totality of circumstances
analysis.2 3 8  Linkage-and the underlying values it serves-has
236. SENATE REPORT 417, supra note 8.
237. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at36-37.
238. California Attorney General Bill Lockyer recently noted that any po-
tential
plaintiff's task would be made more imposing by the several judicial
decisions under the [Voting Rights Act] which recognizes state's
strong interest in maintaining a state court system and election struc-
ture in which the jurisdictional and electoral bases of trial courts are
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repeatedly been found to outweigh evidence of some degree of vote
dilution in judicial election cases, resulting in a finding of no Section
2 violation.
Even if some degree of vote dilution is shown, an additional part
of the plaintiff s burden is to show the existence of a proper remedy.
This has been a stumbling block for many challenges to judicial
elections. Among the proposed remedies that the federal appellate
courts have rejected are:
1. the creation of electoral subdistricts, where (for example)
judges are elected from a small part of the county but can
hear cases from throughout the county;
2. the subdivision of the larger jurisdiction into smaller dis-
tricts, with linkage maintained within the smaller districts,
which would have additional effects on the state's venue
rules and the composition of jury panels;
3. the creation of a combination of single- and multi-member
subdistricts, with primaries from the subdistricts followed
by retention elections from the entire district; and
4. cumulative voting systems.
An additional issue is whether the federal court may override
state constitutional or statutory provisions in fashioning a remedy.
Generally, the cases appear to hold that if there is a settlement of liti-
gation without a finding that Section 2 has been violated-for exam-
ple, under a consent decree where there is no admission of liability-
any remedy must be consistent with state law. After liability has
been found-i.e., after the plaintiff has satisfied the three precondi-
tions, and the totality of circumstances analysis has been resolved in
favor of the plaintiffs--the federal court may impose a remedy which
overrides or supplants state law. Thus, for example, the constitu-
tional provision of one superior court per county could not be over-
ridden except at the ballot box or after a finding of liability under
Section 2.
coextensive.
Letter from Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, to Victor E. Chavez,
Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, at 2 (Sept. 21, 1999) (on
file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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These facts suggest the following conclusions:
1. Section 2 litigation is highly fact-intensive. None of the
three threshold Gingles factors can be assumed; rather, the
plaintiff must prove each of themwith specific evidence, of
suitable depth and recency, tailored to the minority groups
and the specific districts at issue. This is an extremely ex-
pensive and burdensome undertaking for any plaintiff, and
the cases demonstrate that the penalty for any attempt to
skimp in the presentation of this evidence is summary
judgment against the plaintiff;
2. the burden is also on the plaintiff to show that the specific
remedy proffered is appropriate. Failure to articulate an
appropriate remedy will defeat an otherwise meritorious
Section 2 vote dilution claim;
3. the federal courts have repeatedly recognized that judicial
elections involve features and interests that are unique.
The courts have been highly protective of those interests;
and
4. in judicial election cases, unless a Section 2 violation is
actually found, the federal courts rarely approve consent
decrees requiring changes in state law unless the state itself
has adopted the change by the legislative or electoral proc-
ess normally required to amend its constitution or laws.
While none of these circumstances necessarily precludes a suc-
cessful Section 2 challenge to judicial elections in Los Angeles
County, individually and collectively, they suggest that such a chal-
lenge faces even more serious obstacles than a Section 2 challenge to
other types of elections. These difficulties are the reasons that there
have apparently been no successful challenges under Section 2 to a
judicial election system in the last decade.
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